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Abstract
Does workload constitute a bottleneck to a public agency’s mission, and if so, to what extent?
We ask these questions in the context of the US government’s procurement of R&D. We link
tender, contract, patent, and office records to the identity of the officer responsible for the pro-
curement process to estimate how workload in the federal acquisition unit affects the execution
of R&D contracts. The identification comes from unanticipated retirement shifts among con-
tracting officers, which we use to instrument workload. We find a large increase in patenting at
the extensive margin when the same officer is exposed to a declining workload. In our sample,
an additional contracting officer in the procurement unit, holding fixed the procurement budget
and number of purchases, leads to a two percentage point increase in the probability for an
R&D contract to generate patents. We provide suggestive evidence that backlogged contracting
officers are unable to devote enough time to tender and contract specifications.
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1 Introduction
Governments frequently use their extensive purchasing power to promote an array of policy ob-
jectives (Simcoe and Toffel 2014). In particular, technical and scientific progress often depends on
public spending, as shown by recent studies. Among the most influential, Fleming et al. (2019)
show that in the US, federal government research increasingly drives the inventive activities that
ultimately lead to jobs, industrial competitiveness, and entrepreneurial success. Moretti et al.
(2019) provide evidence that government-funded R&D spurs private investment in R&D. The au-
thors also suggest that defense-related R&D spending is the most important de facto industrial
policy by which the US government influences the pace and direction of innovation in the country.
Indeed, federal R&D spending reached nearly $130 billion in 2018 and accounted for about twenty
percent of all R&D conducted in the US that year.1
One of the main channels through which the government funds innovative activities is through
the procurement of R&D from business and higher education institutes. In de Rassenfosse et al.
(2019), public procurement is reported to have accounted for about one-third of the US federally
funded R&D in 2015, with the remainder distributed among research grants, cooperative agree-
ments, and internal research at government laboratories (Bruce and de Figueiredo 2020). Even
though, according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 35.003, the primary objective of
R&D procurement is to acquire supplies or services for the direct benefit or use of federal agencies,
policymakers and scholars increasingly view this type of public spending as a critical innovation
policy tool with important spillover effects on the private sector and significant impacts on end-
users. Anecdotal and historical evidence suggest that US federal procurement has been critical
to the development of some of the most influential technologies invented in the 20th and 21st
centuries, from computers and the Internet to GPS systems and robotics. Recent empirical con-
tributions find support for the existence of such a link, indicating that R&D procurement can
influence firms’ innovative behavior and affect the direction of technological change (Raiteri 2018).
Given the relevance of R&D procurement to innovation, understanding the factors determining
the success or failure of this type of government contracting has implications for policy. Innovation
scholars emphasize the role of public agencies (i.e., the buyers) in clearly identifying their needs
and specifying functional requirements for the procured activity that enable innovative solutions
(Edquist 2015). An extensive strand of theoretical and empirical work on standard procurement
suggests that the decisions made by the official responsible for the procurement process—commonly
referred to as the contracting officer (CO)—may have a strong impact on the performance of the
contract (Decarolis et al. 2020; Best et al. 2017; Bucciol et al. 2020; Baltrunaite et al. 2021).
This thread of research is motivated by the CO being the leading party in the contract planning,
solicitation, and award stages of the procurement process (Rendon et al. 2012), in addition to
being actively involved in the needs assessment and contract execution phases. This means that
COs are responsible for preparing pre-award solicitations and requests for proposals, selecting the
procedure for contract award (e.g., sealed bidding or negotiations), determining contract terms,
influencing the level of competition, identifying vendors, and issuing the contract, among the other
key pre-award decisions. COs have wide discretionary power in performing these tasks, and their
1Source: National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2017-18 Data Update, National Science Foundation.
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decisions may arguably affect contract performance outcome.
The demand-side relevance in the context of publicly funded R&D is highlighted by Bruce
et al. (2019), who emphasize that federally funded R&D grants in the US have poorer innovation
output than cooperative agreements, for which the buyer has greater discretion over the project.2
Accordingly, the buyer’s role should be even more central to procurement contracts, as they imply
the highest degree of control over the R&D process compared to cooperative agreements and grants.
Following this reasoning, Decarolis et al. (2021) provide the first empirical quantification of the
importance of public buyers for R&D procurement success. In particular, the authors find that
a disruptive event in the purchasing office—i.e., the death of relevant contracting employees—
reduces the probability of a contract to deliver patented inventions. The effect they find appears
to be driven by the pre-award phase, on which the CO has, in fact, the greatest impact. However,
although Decarolis et al. (2021) show that contracting authorities matter for R&D procurement,
the data and methodology used do not provide clear evidence on which agency characteristics affect
the success of a federal R&D contract.
Existing literature indicates that workload can be a severe source of capacity constraints in
contracting. As the workload increases, the COs can spend less time on each task they are re-
sponsible for, leading to suboptimal contract specifications and poorer performance. Contributing
to the discussion of how institutions shape new knowledge (Furman and Stern 2011), this paper
quantifies the impact of bureaucratic workload on the innovativeness of procurement of R&D in
the context of a developed economy such as the US and, to do so, combines several different data
sources for the first time. First, we use the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which
contains information on every contract awarded by US federal agencies. Second, we use the 3PFL
Database of Federally Funded Patents (3PFL) collected by de Rassenfosse et al. (2019)—and em-
ployed in Decarolis et al. (2021)—to trace patented inventions associated with a federal contract
and thus measure R&D contract performance, in line with the literature (Bruce et al. 2019). Third,
we collect extensive information about the tender stage of the awards from the Federal Business
Opportunities (FedBizOpp) website, including information about the identity of the CO. The lat-
ter information is more readily available for contracts awarded by the US Department of the Air
Force, one of the major subdivisions of the US DoD. As nearly half of all R&D contracts awarded
by the Air Force are from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), and because of the rich
information on COs in that subsample necessary for our empirical strategy, we focus on contracts
awarded by the contracting offices that compose the AFRL. We count the number of COs actively
involved in procuring R&D projects in a given year: Following Warren (2014) and controlling for
the number of R&D awards and the office’s budget, we use this measure as an inverse indicator of
the office’s workload. After this data selection and merging process, we end up with a sample of
1,970 R&D contracts representing the universe of AFRL’s R&D procurement processes featured
with COs’ records for 2005 through 2012.
Identifying the effect of the buyer’s workload on R&D contract performance presents multiple
challenges. First, the quality of the CO assigned to a particular contract is key in our setting as
it is correlated with both the outcome and the workload. In case of a sudden and unpredictable
2Grants or cooperative agreements should be used when the primary purpose of the transaction is to stimulate
or support R&D for another public purpose (FAR 35.003)
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jump in workload, the office manager (also referred to as the program manager) could still assign
the more complex projects that require extra effort and expertise to the highest quality (or most
experienced) COs who have above-average productivity. In such cases, we would then underesti-
mate the potential effect of a shock in workload for offices staffed with more high-quality COs and
overestimate the shock for offices with fewer high-quality COs. Thanks to the wealth of informa-
tion made available by FedBizOpps, we solve this issue by including CO fixed effects. A second
unobserved factor that may introduce bias into our estimates involves the average complexity of the
yearly procurement activity of the office, which is unobservable to the econometrician but likely
anticipated by the program manager who plans the budget and employment in advance. This
omitted information is also correlated both with the patentability odds of a project and workload.
To handle this additional source of bias, we use an instrumental variable (IV) method that ex-
ploits exogenous changes in contracting employment based on unexpected retirement-postponing
decisions. For this purpose, we use a fourth data source (i.e., FedScope) which contains detailed
characteristics of the public workforce. In particular, we construct an instrument that builds on
the fact that retirement decisions among federal employees are strongly influenced by i) the attain-
ment of the threshold years of service that qualify workers for immediate pension benefits and ii)
idiosyncratic motives. Although eligibility for retirement is anticipated by the program manager
who makes hiring decisions in advance, actual retirement could be postponed, and according to
the relevant literature, managers have little influence on individual retirement decisions (Lewis
and Pitts 2018). Therefore, we consider the difference between the number of COs eligible for re-
tirement and actual retirees to be a good potential indicator of an unanticipated workload shock.
Specifically, the larger the difference between the number of COs eligible to retire and the actual
retirement counts in the same office, the larger the number of COs who will decide to postpone
retirement in divergence from the expectations of the office manager. As managers’ hiring decisions
are based on the scale of expected retirement, the larger this difference, the larger the short-run
positive shock to the number of COs active in an office.
Our IV estimation strategy allows us to estimate a causal effect of a purchasing unit’s work-
load on R&D contract outcomes, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than the
corresponding endogenous model estimates. Our results stress that the same CO exposed to an
increase in the workload—proxied by a decrease in the number of other COs employed, holding
fixed the number of R&D purchases by the office and their total obligated amount—determines
a decrease in the average probability of awards delivering a patented invention. Specifically, one
additional CO in the procurement unit (corresponding to 3 percent of the average number of COs
in the office-year pair in our sample) leads to a two percentage point increase in the probability
for an R&D contract to generate patents. To provide a more transparent economic interpretation
of the estimates, we consider what would happen if we used them to infer the effect of raising
the workload of all AFRL’s office-year combinations to the level of the office-year with the largest
backlog in our sample. If we brought all offices up to its level, this would imply a reduction in
the number of patents by 13 percentage points on average per contract (i.e., about 50 percent less
likely).
Consistent with our findings, Warren (2014) shows that when procuring supplies and services,
contracting offices that experience workload spikes are more likely to choose contract terms that
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ultimately result in poorer contract performance. Specifically, contracts awarded by busier offices
undergo more modifications of the original contract and obligate more dollars on average. In this
paper, to the best of our knowledge, we empirically investigate for the first time the relationship
between the workload of the CO and the performance of R&D contracts awarded by the same
bureaucrat. Given the high complexity of the tasks, the discretionary power of the CO, and the
relevance of the pre-award phase in R&D procurement, our hypothesis that workload is particularly
disruptive in this setting is validated by empirical analysis.
Our results are robust to several modifications in the empirical specification, emphasize the
variation of workload as a driver of post-award procurement outcomes—in this vein, contributing
to the related literature3— and have relevant policy implications. First, they confirm the evidence
provided in the literature on the importance of the buyer and show that the government should
pay particular attention to the workload of contracting employees during the tender stage and
ensure adequate staffing. Second, our results show that capacity constraints at the contracting
office level could limit the ability of the government to translate increases in the budget allocated
to R&D work, intended to produce additional technical knowledge, into valuable knowledge and
innovation. This, in turn, could dampen the positive spillover effects that publicly funded R&D
has been shown to have on the economy (Fleming et al. 2019; Moretti et al. 2019). On a final note,
we acknowledge the functioning of public bureaucracies as a key driver of government effectiveness
(Weber 1921) and, in turn, the ability of the state to govern effectively as a crucial determinant of
economic activity (Acemoglu 2005). Our micro-quantification of the impact of workload on R&D
procurement outcomes underscores the disruptive role of a backlogged contracting staff within
public organizations in terms of innovative spillovers to the economy and how unblocking such a
bottleneck may be relevant for the efficient delivery of public goods.
Our data do not allow us to unambiguously identify the channel through which the additional
workload worsens contracting output. In particular, we can neither observe nor proxy the actual
effort the CO put in for specific procurement activities and, therefore, we cannot determine if the
increases in workload lead to a reduction in the effort provided for a single contract. That said,
the heterogeneity of the R&D activities in our sample nevertheless allows us to provide indirect
evidence of the importance of the CO in drafting solicitations and contractual agreements in a
clear work statement. Such relevance reaches its maximum for contracts awarded for intermediate
stages of development, especially for applied research, where contracts for the procurement of R&D
work are relatively definable. In such cases, and workload permitting, the CO has room to draft a
request for proposal and the resulting contract clearly and completely. To test this hypothesis, we
split our sample into three groups based on the R&D stages, Basic Research, Applied Research,
and Advanced Development, and run the same model as in the focal analysis. We demonstrate
that the overall negative baseline effect of workload on contract performance seems to be largely
driven by applied research awards. Although we are aware this result does not provide conclusive
evidence, it strongly suggests that backlogged COs cannot devote enough time to tender and
3This work relates to the growing economic analysis of the effects of different designs and institutions on procure-
ment outcomes. Examples include awarding design (Decarolis 2014, 2018), wasteful year-end spending (Liebman
and Mahoney 2017), external audits (Gerardino et al. 2017), industry consolidation (Carril and Duggan 2020),
performance-based insurance schemes (Giuffrida and Rovigatti 2018), and the impact of centralized purchase agree-
ments (Bandiera et al. 2009).
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contract specification, with a reduction in the performance of the contracts they award.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline the institutional setup,
identification problem, and our research design. Data sources and sample selection are described
in Section 3. Section 4 presents our baseline results and the robustness analysis. In Section 5, we
discuss a potential mechanisms underlying our findings. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 Institutional and Empirical Setting
2.1 Trends in the US contracting staff’s workload
In the previous section, we briefly discussed the role of COs in the public procurement process and
argued that they are particularly sensitive to an increase in workload, especially in the complex
realm of R&D contracting, due to the multitude of tasks involved. But problems arising from
backlogged contracting personnel would be a second-order problem if spikes in agency workloads
were sporadic and temporary events. However, over the past twenty years, federal institutions and
scholars have expressed concern about an increasing trend in procurement spending that has not
been accompanied by adequate growth in contract personnel.
In 2007, the Acquisition Advisory Panel reported to the Office of Federal Procurement Pol-
icy and the US Congress that between 2000 and 2005, total government purchasing volume had
increased by nearly 75 percent, from $219 billion to more than $380 billion (AAP 2007), while
the federal procurement workforce had remained stable during the same period and shrank signif-
icantly compared to the 1990s. The panel reported a significant mismatch between the demands
on the acquisition workforce and the personnel available to meet them and recommended that an
improved human capital planning process be implemented. In 2010, procurement volume reached
$534 billion, and although it declined to $430 billion in 2015, the upward trend has continued over
the past five years, reaching $579 billion in 2019.4 Federal spending on R&D followed a similar
trend, peaking at $57 billion in 2010 with a subsequent decline to $38 billion in 2015, followed by
another increase to $52 billion in 2020. As a result, several agencies still lament an acquisition
workforce shortage. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted that,
although the DoD made important changes to its workforce planning to address the AAP 2007’s
recommendation and increased its procurement workforce by 24 percent between 2006 and 2016,
in 2017, it still fell well short of its workforce growth goal, particularly in areas such as contracting
and audit (GAO 2017). In 2017, the GAO highlighted persistent problems with the acquisition
workforce in its High-Risk list and emphasized that DoD agencies were still facing challenges
maintaining sufficient staffing levels and overseeing their acquisition workforce.5
The increase in the federal contracting budget and institutional concerns are not the only in-
dications that contracting personnel are struggling with problems stemming from excessive work-
loads. For example, studies based on survey data confirm that federal procurement personnel
cite understaffing as one of the primary problems within their work unit (Rau and Stambersky
2009). Specifically, Rendon et al. (2012) show that in two of the DoD’s largest subagencies, the
4Source: www.usaspending.gov.
5In 1990, the GAO began a program to report on government operations identified as high risk. The list is used
to identify and address serious vulnerabilities in areas where significant resources are expended and critical services
are provided to the public. See https://www.gao.gov/highrisk/overview.
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Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, the vast majority of procurement
personnel responsible for service acquisition disagree that the size of the procurement workforce is
adequate to meet objectives and also disagree that vacant positions are adequately filled.
2.2 Research design and prima facie evidence
As discussed above, peaks in workload strongly influence the discretionary decisions of COs, and
previous research has consistently found that, in a non-R&D context, the performance of contracts
worsens.6 The primary objective of this paper is to assess whether an increase in workload within
contracting offices procuring R&D negatively affects contract performance.7 Properly identifying
such an effect presents us with several empirical challenges. First, we need to define a satisfac-
tory method to measure both the workload of the procurement office and the performance of a
particular R&D project. Second, we need to consider potential factors that might challenge the
causal interpretation of a negative relationship between our measures of workload and project
performance.
To address the measurement issues, we rely largely on the recent literature. Warren (2014)
discusses the complexities associated with constructing a robust measure of workload. In the paper,
the author opts for a relatively agnostic approach and uses the size of contracting personnel (i.e.,
COs plus lower-level employees) in a federal agency while controlling for the number of contracts
(purchases, from now on) as a proxy for office workload. We follow a similar approach and use
the CO employment actively working in the R&D process for a contracting office in a given fiscal
year as a proxy for the workload. As in Warren (2014), we control for the number of purchases; in
addition, we use the total amount of obligations (budget, from now on) of the contracting agency
during a fiscal year. The main difference is that our focus is exclusively on R&D contracting.
Therefore, our workload measure counts only COs responsible for R&D procurement, and in the
same vein, we control only for the number of contracts and dollars obligated by a given office
for the procured R&D activities. In contrast to Warren (2014), our data and setting allow us to
pinpoint the exact procurement unit of a federal agency; these and other details about the office
and the definition of the CO are presented in Section 3.1.
Regarding the measurement of R&D contract performance, we follow the recent contribution of
Decarolis et al. (2021) and Bruce et al. (2019). As reported in FAR Part 35, most R&D contracts
are focused on goals for which work or methods cannot be precisely described in advance and
for which it is not easy to assess the probabilities of success ex-ante. Because of the uncertainty
that characterizes this process and the resulting high degree of incompleteness, it is not easy
to estimate costs accurately. For this reason, FAR recommends the use of cost-reimbursement
contracts for R&D procurements rather than fixed-price contracts, which are typically preferred
for off-the-shelf procurements and more standardized services.8 Instead, the primary goal of R&D
6FAR 1.602 details the role and responsibilities of the federal CO.
7A contracting office is an entity that executes procurement transactions—goods, services, constructions, and
R&D—on behalf of the government. A contracting office belongs only to a subagency, that is, the bureau responsible
for the transaction.
8Fixed-price and cost-plus contracts are two different types of contracts commonly used in procurement. In fixed-
price contracts, the buyer offers the seller a predetermined price to complete the project. In a cost-plus contract, no
price is set, but the contractor is reimbursed for the cost plus a markup. Cost-plus contracts are generally preferred
for the procurement of R&D. Approximately 80 percent of R&D contracts over $1 million awarded yearly by federal
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contracts is to advance scientific and technical knowledge and apply that knowledge to the extent
necessary to achieve agency goals, not to deliver a product in the most cost- and time-effective
manner. Given the unique characteristics associated with R&D contracting, standard measures
of contract performance—such as unit price comparisons, cost overruns, time delays, and the
number of contract renegotiations—are not well suited to assessing the performance of an R&D
contract. As in Bruce et al. (2019) and Decarolis et al. (2021), we consider an R&D contract to be
successful if associated with subsequently patented inventions. Although using patents as a proxy
for innovation is not without drawbacks, the issuance of a patent application associated with an
R&D contract ensures that the contract has generated new knowledge that can be used to solve
a particular technical problem.9 In addition, Peña et al. (2017) confirm that most DoD research
offices themselves use metrics such as patent applications and grants to assess the success of their
early-stage research and technology projects.
Once we have defined a valid measure for an office’s workload and one for the outcome of an
R&D contract, we need to consider how to identify the impact of the former on the latter. As
a first step, we can match trends in R&D contracting personnel in those federal agencies that
regularly purchase R&D from the private sector with the dynamics of R&D procurement spending
and the number of patents associated with those contracts. Figure (1) shows these trends. As the
figure shows, for general contracting, there were substantial increases in R&D expenditures (solid
line) between 2005 and 2008, while the size of the acquisition forces in these offices (dashed line)
remained essentially stable. In 2009-2012, the data show a reversal of trends: the size of R&D
contracts consistently declined, while the size of the CO pool steadily increased between 2009 and
2012. Therefore, the workload of COs for R&D contracts seems to have increased until 2008 and
decreased since then. Interestingly, the number of patents associated with contracts awarded by the
offices (dotted line) seems to show a negative correlation with workload: it decreases significantly
between 2005 and 2008 and reverses the trend after 2008 and especially since 2010. This could
be considered as prima facie evidence of a negative impact of COs’ workload on the performance
of the R&D contracts they award. However, providing evidence that would support a causal
interpretation of this relationship requires much more thought.
Ideally, we would look at all federal contracting offices that award contracts for the procurement
of R&D and randomly divide them into different groups. We would then assign a different number
of additional COs to each group; finally, we would evaluate whether the contracts awarded by
the offices whose CO employment grows (shrinks), i.e., offices with a lower (higher) workload per
officer, subsequently experience a higher (lower) likelihood of being associated with a patented
invention. In such an ideal experiment, randomization of the treatment would ensure that the
relationship between workload and contract performance is causal. Unfortunately, even with a
small sample of contracting offices, conducting such an experiment is not feasible. Nonetheless,
US federal agencies produce a wealth of observational data that, if properly used, would allow us
to examine the existence of a causal relationship (if any) between COs’ workload and contract
performance. Section 3.1 describes the data in detail, but for now, it is sufficient to stress that our
agencies are cost-plus contracts (source: usaspending.gov).
9A discussion of the drawbacks of measuring R&D activity via generated patents and how we deal with them is
covered in Section 3.1.
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Figure 1: Workload and Patent Trends
Notes: Average annual R&D obligated budget (solid line), contracting force (dashed line), and number of patents connected
to contracts (dotted line). The source is the FPDS database and all agencies awarding at least one R&D contract in the
sample are considered.
data provide sufficient information to estimate the following linear probability model:
Patenti,k,t = c+ βLog # COk,t + γXi + δZk,t + ζk + ζt + εi,k,t, (1)
where the variable Patenti,k,t reports whether R&D contract i awarded by the office k in the fiscal
year t led at least to a patented invention and the Log#COk,t reports the CO employment in
log-terms. Xi is a vector of controls for contract characteristics, whereas Zk,t is a vector that
includes control variables at the office-fiscal-year level, such as the budget and purchases. The
vectors ζk and ζt include a set of office- and fiscal-year fixed effects. A detailed description of the
control variables is provided in Section 3.1.
Although the wealth of information available for each contract and awarding office allows us to
control for several potential confounding factors that may affect the relationship between workload
and contract performance, the use of observational data still presents some fundamental challenges
for identification. First, unlike in the ideal experiment, CO employment is not randomly decided.
In year t− 1, the program manager of a particular federal contracting office plans the budget for
purchases to be made for the fiscal year t. Specifically, in January of fiscal year t−1, federal agencies
update the budget plan for t and submit it (as part of the DoD budget) to Congress, which approves
it before the beginning of the new fiscal year (i.e., October of the same calendar year).10 Thus, after
taking into account the human resources available at t− 1, the incoming workload of an office at
10The DoD budget is requested along with the budgets of all other departments and constitutes the budget of
the US government, which the President submits in early February at t − 1. Typically, agencies begin preparing
their proposals about 18 months before the budget takes effect. The budget must be passed no later than t − 1
on September 30, just before the start of the new fiscal year. Otherwise, the government will have no budget, it
will shut down, and many functions will cease. Then Congress must pass a continuing resolution to temporarily
fund the government. Therefore, each office must know its budget before the fiscal year begins in order to operate.
The Department of the Air Force, which is the focus of our empirical analysis, sets department-level budget years
in advance while also conducting detailed budget estimates for each office that plans for the near future. Source:
https://www.usa.gov/budget.
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time t is known in advance to the contracting office manager. Therefore, the manager can already
decide at t − 1 to hire additional contracting staff (including COs and other procurement staff)
in case of an expected growing workload. If the office budget could perfectly measure workload,
this would not pose a critical problem for identification as long as we can control for trends in the
office budget. However, as discussed by Warren (2014), measuring workload by simply considering
the budget would overestimate the workload of officials who draft contracts for the simplest tasks.
This problem is particularly relevant in the context of technology procurement, especially in the
procurement of R&D. The size of a contract could depend heavily on the fixed costs of the R&D
project to be performed, but these fixed costs do not necessarily correlate with the complexity of the
task, a contract characteristic that we cannot measure perfectly in our cross-R&D-category data.
Although we can control for other contract-specific characteristics that might partially explain the
technical complexity of a task, if the complexity level of the average contract awarded by a given
office changes over time, the program manager can adjust the workforce accordingly. If the manager
knows at t− 1 that the office will need to award contracts to perform more complex tasks at t and
knows that awarding more contracts for more complex tasks will require more clerk time and effort,
the office manager can plan to hire additional COs in year t − 1. The possibility of anticipating
the increase in workload due to the increase in average task complexity of the contract implies a
positive correlation between our main explanatory variable, Log#COk,t, and the omitted factor,
i.e., the average complexity of the contracts awarded by an office over time. At the same time, the
complexity of the specific task for which a contract is awarded—which in turn is omitted—could
be strongly correlated with our outcome variable. More complex tasks are almost by definition
more uncertain, and their probability of success is lower than simpler tasks. In the context of R&D
contracting, this means that a more complex research project is more likely to lead to inconclusive
and thus unpatentable results. As omitted project complexity is negatively correlated with the
variable Patenti,k,t and positively correlated with our variable of interest Log#COk,t, we would
expect the estimate of our coefficient of interest β in equation (1) to be downward biased.
A second unobserved factor that may introduce bias into our estimates involves the quality
of the CO assigned to the contract. Even if we could rule out the possibility that the program
manager could anticipate the workload and adjust the CO employment to such needs, the manager
would still be able to make some adjustments to minimize the impact of an increase in workload.
For example, even in the event of a sudden and unpredictable jump in workload, the manager
could still assign the more complex projects that require extra effort and expertise to the higher
quality (or more experienced) COs who have above-average productivity. Therefore, offices with
a greater proportion of high-quality COs would be better able to respond to unforeseen shocks in
workload. In such cases, we would then underestimate the potential effect of a shock in workload
for offices staffed with more high-quality COs and overestimate the shock for offices with fewer
high-quality COs.
To tackle the two threats to identification described above, we implement a two-step strategy.
First, we focus on a specific set of offices for which we can obtain reliable information about the
identity of the CO who awards a particular contract. In particular, we use data obtained from
the FedBizOpps platform (described in detail in the next subsection). The website reports con-
tact information about the CO in charge of a procurement process to facilitate communication
10
between potentially interested contractors and the awarding agency. Unfortunately, for most fed-
eral agencies that award R&D contracts, contact information about the CO is reported sparingly
and incompletely. However, for a few agencies, in particular the Department of the Air Force,
the name and contact information of the relevant COs are reported quite systematically. Taking
advantage of this, we focus on the Air Force contracting offices that award the vast majority of
R&D contracts, and in particular those offices that are part of the AFRL. Then, for R&D contracts
awarded by these offices, we can pinpoint the CO responsible for awarding the contract. This fact
allows us to rewrite the equation (1) as
Patenti,k,t,o = c+ βLog # COk,t + γXi + δZk,t + ζk + ζt + ζo + εi,k,t,o, (2)
where ζo is an additional vector of CO fixed effects, allowing us to account for the intrinsic
quality—plus other time-invariant idiosyncrasies—of the CO awarding the contract.
To address the residual source of endogeneity provided by the omitted complexity, we adopt
an IV approach. In our setting, the instrument must identify a shock in the workload that cannot
be predicted by the program manager. Warren (2014) considers a similar problem and approach
and proposes the number of retiring contracting employees as an IV. The main idea behind this
choice is that, as discussed by Asch et al. (2005), in the US civil service, retirements are mainly
driven by the rules that govern pension obligations. More specifically, the retirement decision is
strongly influenced by the attainment of the threshold years of service that qualify an employee for
immediate pension benefits. However, at time t − 1, the head of a given contracting office knows
how many of the employees are eligible for retirement benefits at t. As both the office’s budget
and purchases at t are established at t− 1, the manager would anticipate fluctuations in both the
workload and the workforce and make hiring decisions accordingly. If many COs are retirement
eligible at t, the manager is likely to hire more staff at t− 1 to compensate for future retirement.
In addition, hiring at t− 1 is especially important if the size of the retirement-eligible population
at t requires it, as hiring a new CO could be a lengthy process. Despite the goal of 80 days set
by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2008, federal agencies took an average of 106
days to hire a new employee in 2017 (127 days for the DoD), with little change from 2004 when
the average was 103 days (GAO 2019). This pattern is confirmed in our data: the correlation of
retirement eligible at t− 1 with hiring at t− 1 and hiring at t is 0.72 and 0.73, respectively.
At t, actual retirement is realized. Actual retirement could be higher or lower than predicted
by the program manager, and according to several empirical papers, managers have little influence
on idiosyncratic retirement decisions (Lewis and Pitts 2018). Therefore, we consider the difference
between the counts of eligible retirement and actual retirement to be a good candidate measure
of an unanticipated workload shock (controlling for budget, purchases, and officer quality). The
larger the difference between the number of officers eligible to retire in the service at t − 1 and
the actual retirement in the same office at t, the larger the number of COs who (unexpectedly)
decide to postpone retirement. As managers’ hiring decisions are based on the number of expected
retirees, the larger the difference, the larger the short-run positive shock to the number of COs
active in an office at t.11
11In Section 4.2, we show that our results hold when the actual retirement counts among the contracting staff are
used as an IV as in Warren (2014).
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3 Data
3.1 Data sources and description of variables
The dataset developed for this study combines four data sources for the first time.
FPDS To retrieve contract-specific information, we rely on the FPDS, the source of procurement
data of the US government used extensively in recent research, including studies by Liebman and
Mahoney (2017), Warren (2014), Kang and Miller (2017), Giuffrida and Rovigatti (2018), Decarolis
et al. (2020). Since fiscal year 2000, federal agencies have been required to complete procurement
action reports, which in turn feed into the FPDS. The FPDS covers all federal contracting agency
transactions related to an award above the federal micro-purchase threshold.12 Like Decarolis
et al. (2021), we focus only on the pool of R&D contracts from FPDS. The R&D code (and stage)
specified for each award comes from the FPDS variable “Product or Service Code.”13
Moreover, most of the other information we use in our empirical analysis to build covariates
or fixed effects comes from FPDS. We observe the Fiscal Year of the project award; the expected
cost at the award stage (Award Amount) and the final cost, computed as the cumulative sum of
the Award Amount with all subsequent price renegotiations; the expected and actual duration of
a project (Expected Duration and Final Duration, respectively). Last Week identifies a project if
it is awarded in the last week of the fiscal year (i.e., the last seven days of September).14
3PFL de Rassenfosse et al. (2019) exploit the FAR to trace patented inventions directly related
to federal contracts. The 3PFL database covers USPTO patents granted between 2005 and 2018.
More specifically, we use the information contained in the 3PFL database to construct our per-
formance measures for our sample of R&D contracts with the extensive margin of patents, i.e.,
Patent, which is a dummy indicating that the project is associated with at least one registered
patent. We also observe the total number of patented inventions associated with a given federal
R&D contract.
Two main concerns might cast doubt on the suitability of patents as a proxy for the innovative
output of an R&D contract in our context. First, a contractor might choose to favor secrecy over
12The value was $3,000 during the period under analysis. In 2015, it was revised to $3,500; in 2020, it was revised
again and increased from $3,500 to $10,000. The amounts for public R&D projects are typically very high, and we
can confidently state that we observe the universe of these projects over the period under analysis.
13The variable consists of two alphabetic and two numeric digits. The first digit is always the letter “A” to
identify R&D; the second digit is alphabetic “A” through “Z” to identify the major category of R&D; the third
digit is numeric, 1 through 9, to identify a subdivision of the major category of R&D. The categorical variable
R&D Category is defined according to the combination of the first three digits. The fourth digit is numeric, 1
to 7, to identify the corresponding level of R&D with: (1) Basic Research; (2) Applied Research and Exploratory
Development; (3) Advanced Development; (4) Engineering Development; (5) Operational Systems Development;
(6) Management and Support; (7) Commercialization. The categorical variable Stage is generated accordingly. The
R&D usually includes the first six categories. According to the FPDS Product or Service Code Manual, the first stage
(i.e., basic research) includes all scientific endeavors and experiments aimed at expanding the body of knowledge and
forms part of the basis for subsequent applied research and exploratory and advanced development in the various
disciplines, as well as new or improved functional capabilities. The second stage includes all efforts directed toward
solving specific problems except major development projects. Advanced development includes all efforts directed at
projects that have transitioned to hardware development for testing, for example. The primary outcome of this type
of effort is proof of design concept and/or prototype.
14This control variable is similar to Liebman and Mahoney (2017), who highlight how the federal budget expiring
at the end of the fiscal year creates incentives for government buyers to rush to spend resources on low-quality
projects.
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patenting to protect its invention. However, FAR 27.3 states that a contractor must timely file a
patent application and disclose it to the government to retain title to an invention made under a
government contract. If the contractor fails to do so, it risks losing the title to the invention as the
government has the right to file a patent application on its behalf. So there are strong incentives for
the contractor to file a patent application when an invention materializes. Second, the government
itself may recommend the contractors keep the invention secret in the interest of national security.
In such cases, even if the contractor has duly filed a patent application, the Patent Office imposes
a secrecy order that halts (at least temporarily) the patent prosecution process.15 Nevertheless, as
discussed in de Rassenfosse et al. (2020) and Decarolis et al. (2021), the actual number of secrecy
orders issued each year is quite small and only a limited number of these orders appear to target
the output of federal R&D contracts.
FedBizOpps The federal acquisition process begins when an agency determines its requirements
and how to procure them. If the agency’s CO determines that the appropriate method for procur-
ing the goods or services is a contract, and the expected value is greater than $25,000, then the
contracting authority is required by the FAR to post a solicitation on the FedBizOpps platform.16
The FedBizOpps can be thought of as the government’s call for tenders point-of-entry, and its pur-
pose is to collect, maintain, and disseminate information to the public about federal solicitations.
System information is used to administer and manage access by federal buyers, maintain lists of
interested vendors, and notify vendors of federal solicitations of business interest. Government
contractors use FedBizOpps as a search engine to find immediate solicitations or bid opportunities
as well as archived records.
A subset of solicitations on FedBizOpps reports an additional piece of information: the identity
of the bureaucrat responsible for the solicitation process, i.e., the CO (and the associated contract
identifier once awarded and tracked by FPDS). This point of contact is located at the bottom of
the solicitation documents and includes the first and last name, title, phone number, and email
address of the CO. For R&D procurement solicitations, this information is particularly rich for
the activity of the AFRL, and we refer the reader to Section 3.2 for more details on the sample
of contracting offices under study. We use this valuable information to calculate the total number
of COs actively working on the procurement of R&D in AFRL purchasing units in a given fiscal
year. We have already defined this variable as # COs and referred to it as CO employment. As
discussed in Section 3.3, this variable is the main explanatory variable for the project innovation
outcome under study. In addition, we define Specialist as a dummy variable indicating whether
the CO is assisted by a contract specialist for a particular R&D process.17
15The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 governs this process.
16FBO.gov moved to the beta version SAM.gov in November 2019—after our data collection— and is now known
as Contract Opportunities. See also Carril (2021) for a discussion of the FedBizOpps’ reporting threshold.
17CO and contract specialist fulfill different roles in the procurement process. A CO is an individual who can
bind the US government to a contract and has signature authority as a government contract agent. In the federal
procurement career, the contract specialist acts as a management consultant and assists the CO in planning to
acquire needed goods and services. Only the CO is authorized to sign and administer the contract once awarded.
Thus, the contract specialist is a lower-grade contract bureaucrat. A contract specialist is not always necessary,
while a CO with signature authority is always necessary for a contract to be initiated.
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FedScope The Office of Personnel Management—an independent federal agency that acts as the
central human resources department for the executive branch— collects, maintains, and publishes
data on approximately 96 percent of civilian federal employees. These data are published through
the federal Human Resource database (FedScope), which is the most comprehensive source available
on the size and scope of the US federal workforce.18 Fedscope is the fourth data source we use.
The data are divided into five subject categories (called “cubes”), of which we consider only the
Employment cube and the Separations cube. The Employment cube contains various demographic
characteristics and information about appointments and assignments, such as length of service,
job category, pay grade, pay level, type of appointment, work schedule, and location of each
employee. The Separations cube contains all separation events (inflows and outflows), that is,
employees who are transferred to other offices or agencies, resigned voluntarily, retired, experienced
a reduction in force, were terminated, or died during employment. In both cubes, we focus on GS11-
02 employees, which is the government’s job classification series for contracting and acquisition
personnel, including COs and all second-order contracting jobs. We will label the sum of GS-1102
employees as Contracting Employment. This is an alternative and less conservative measure of
contracting employment—used by (Warren 2014)—to check the robustness of our results to the
definition of the endogenous employment variable.
Importantly, the FedScope dataset allows us to build our IV as outlined in Section 2.2. The
retirement eligibility of federal civilian employees is determined by age and the number of years of
creditable service. People that have reached the minimum retirement age are eligible for immediate
retirement benefits provided they have at least 10 years of creditable service. The minimum
retirement age at the beginning of the period we consider (i.e., 2005) was 55 years and 6 months, and
it was 56 at the end of the period (i.e., 2012).19 To identify the number of retirement-eligible COs
in a given office—which we define as Retirement Eligible— we exploit the information about the
age group and the years of creditable service of the employees in the GS-1102 category as reported
in the Fedscope database employment cube.20 Moreover, Retirement Actual instead indicates the
Contracting Employment who retire during a given fiscal year. Finally, Non-retirement is defined
as the difference between lag Retirement Eligible and Retirement Actual, and is our IV. Before
showing the results, we describe in detail our sample of AFRL’s bureaus and present some relevant
descriptive facts about the data used to connect FedScope and the other data sources.
3.2 The Air Force Research Lab
In this paper, we require a metric for workload within the contracting office. FedScope data are
available at the subagency level—referred to as “AGYSUB”—but the geographic information in
FedScope allows us to determine the location (i.e., state) of each federal employee. Since FedScope
information does not allow us to pinpoint offices below the level of the subagency, we must use the
18The database has exclusions that affect, for example, some national security and intelligence agencies and the
US Postal Service. The data are already used by Decarolis et al. (2020), who also provide a detailed description of
FedScope.
19For details, see: https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers-information/eligibility/.
20We count the number of employees in the GS-1102 category that are eligible for immediate retirement benefits,
i.e., employees older than 55 years of age and with more than 10 years of creditable service, or older than 62 years
of age and five years of service, or older than 65 years of age. Data available at: https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/
employment.asp.
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Figure 2: AFRL Sites
Notes: Operating locations of the AFRL in 2006. Source: Mait (2005).
geographic information to link FedScope to the other data sources.
For the sake of clarity, we emphasize once more that, in our study, we focus on different
contracting offices all belonging to one subagency, namely the AFRL, which is a subunit of the
Department of the Air Force. The AFRL is a scientific research organization operated by the US Air
Force Materiel Command dedicated to the discovery, development, and integration of air and space
combat technologies, planning and executing the Air Force science and technology program, and
providing warfighting capabilities to the air, space, and cyberspace forces of the US. The laboratory
is divided into eight technical directorates and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, based on
various research areas. The latter is primarily a funding body for external research, whereas the
other directorates conduct research internally or on behalf of external entities. Figure (2) shows a
map of AFRL sites throughout the US territory.
According to the FPDS data, procurement of R&D activities at the AFRL—which in the
FPDS raw data amounts to $2.22 billion per year in 2005-2012—is conducted through six different
contracting offices in different branches of the AFRL. AFRL headquarters is located at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. Its primary functions are leadership, policy, and guidance.
The AFRL’s only contracting office in Ohio, i.e., FA8650, as coded in FPDS, is located there.
The Space Vehicles Directorate is one of the branches of the AFRL. Its mission is to develop
and implement space technologies for more effective and less costly warfighting missions. The
Directorate has two headquarters located at different Air Force Bases: Kirtland, New Mexico,
and Hanscom, Massachusetts. Both Directorate headquarters conduct R&D procurements, which
we track through FPDS with two separate contracting offices (FA9453 and FA8718, respectively).
Rome Laboratory is the Air Force “superlab” for command, control, and communications R&D
and is responsible for planning and executing the USAF science and technology program. The
contracting office FA8750 is installed at Rome Laboratory. AFRL’s only R&D procurements in
Ohio, New Mexico, Massachusetts, and New York are performed by those offices. Tyndall and
Eglin are two Air Force bases, both located in Florida. The AFRL’s Florida R&D procurement
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are conducted by the contracting offices of the two bases (i.e., FA8651 and FA9200). Because these
two contracting offices are located in the same state, we are unable to link FedScope information
on separations and employment to specific AFRL contracting offices, so they are excluded from
our sample.21 AFRL’s four purchasing units provide a diverse science and technology portfolio,
ranging from basic and applied research to engineering and operational systems development.
Combining FPDS and FedScope data, we define Same State as a binary variable—which we include
as a covariate in our empirical model—that signals a job performed in the same state where the
contracting office is located.
3.3 Sample selection and descriptive analysis
The merging process is as follows. Our starting point is FPDS R&D data. We start by
splitting the raw transaction records—i.e., all transactions between government procurement offices
and private suppliers—into two main groups: base contracts records and amendment records.
The former refer to the first transaction between a procurement office associated with a given
contracting process and a supplier and correspond to our unit of observation for this study, the
reported characteristics of which constitute the base agreement information. The latter capture all
revisions, modifications, or corrections to the contract. All transactions associated with a contract
are identified by a unique procurement instrument identifier (“PIID”) that marks a signed contract
and all its future modifications; therefore, we can track the contracts’ entire history from award
to completion (or close-out) and link each contract to its revisions. Second, FPDS is combined
with 3PFL and FedBizOpps at the contract level. This is very straightforward as both 3PFL and
FedBizOpps report the contract PIID. Finally, the intermediate dataset is merged with FedScope.
As the level of observation of FedScope is the subagency-state-year, the data must be merged
at that level. The nomenclature of FedScope bureaus differs from that of FPDS, but we have
relied on an external dictionary that maps the variable “Contracting Office Agency ID” in FPDS
to the variable “AGYSUB” of Fedscope.22 Following the discussion above, we limit our focus to
the combined project-level information associated with AFRL awarding agencies FA9453, FA8650,
FA8718, FA8750, which represent 88 and 83 percent, respectively, of the spending and contract
counts in the AFRL raw sample.
We further restrict the sample according to the following rules: R&D activities conducted
within US borders; award amount greater than $25,000; expected contract end date before the
end of the sample; no Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts; 2005-2012; R&D
preceding the commercialization phase.23 This ultimately leaves us with a sample of 1,970 R&D
21For a full description of the sample selection, see Section 3.3.
22FedScope releases are monthly. To ensure temporal consistency with FPDS and FedScope, we employ the
September snapshot of the FedScope cubes as a reference for the closing fiscal year.
23The $25,000 threshold is the lowest contract value associated with a contract publicized in FedBizOpps, as
described above. R&D contracts are usually very large and this selection prompts the loss of very few observa-
tions. Regarding the exclusion of SBIR contracts, these contracts are intended to assist certain small businesses
in conducting innovative activities aimed at their eventual commercialization, not their patentability (Howell 2017;
Bhattacharya 2018). Contracts awarded before the fiscal year 2005 (i.e., October 1, 2004) are very few and of poorer
quality, according to Liebman and Mahoney (2017). Those awarded after 2012 (September 30, 2012) are excluded
because public R&D activity in our data lasts more than three years on average and, once completed, potentially
produces a patent 18 months later on average. Since 3PFL tracks patents registered through 2018, contracts awarded
from fiscal year 2013 onward may not have a patent due to the limited time horizon and not as a poor contract
outcome. Finally, contracts in the commercialization phase are excluded from the analysis because they do not
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contracts, with a total value of $9.6 billion, 12,020 bids submitted, and 579 unique winners (of
which 87 were universities or other higher education institutions). The final sample includes 275
distinct COs, whose associated contracts yielded a total of 522 patents (5 percent of contracts with
one patent, 4 percent with two or more).
Table (1) shows the details of the R&D activities included in the sample. Each cell reports
the number of contracts for each combination of procurement category and R&D stage and the
total number of associated patents in parenthesis. Most contracts and patents are observed for
the first three stages of the R&D process, i.e., basic research, applied research (and exploratory
development), and advanced development.
Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Contracts and Patents per R&D Category and Stage
Category Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Total
AC1: Defense System (Aircraft) 98 ( 13 ) 96 ( 51 ) 92 ( 27 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 289 (91 )
AC2: Defense System (Missile/Space Systems) 88 ( 48 ) 38 ( 1 ) 7 ( 1 ) 0 ( 0 ) 3 ( 6 ) 3 ( 3 ) 139 (59 )
AC5: Defense System (Weapons) 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 (0 )
AC6: Defense System (Electronics/Communication Equipment) 110 ( 72 ) 257 ( 104 ) 53 ( 11 ) 14 ( 1 ) 5 ( 0 ) 6 ( 0 ) 445 (188 )
AC9: Defense System (Miscellaneous Hard Goods) 2 ( 0 ) 11 ( 1 ) 5 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 20 (1 )
AD2: Defense Other (Services) 2 ( 0 ) 2 ( 4 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 4 (4 )
AD6: Defense Other (Construction) 1 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (0 )
AD9: Defense Other (Miscellaneous) 128 ( 6 ) 572 ( 93 ) 169 ( 59 ) 5 ( 0 ) 33 ( 2 ) 0 ( 0 ) 907 (160 )
AE3: Economic Growth (Manufacturing Technology) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 38 ( 6 ) 0 ( 0 ) 40 (2 )
AJ4: General Science/Technology: Engineering 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (0 )
AJ9: General Science/Technology (Other) 23 ( 2 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 23 (2)
AN1: Medical (Biomedical) 0 ( 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (1)
AR1: Space (Aeronautics/Space Technology) 3 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 3 (0)
AZ1: Other R&D 33 ( 8 ) 49 ( 0 ) 9 ( 0 ) 3 ( 2 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 95 (10)
Total 488 (149 ) 1,027 ( 255 ) 339 ( 98 ) 23 ( 3 ) 82 ( 14 ) 11 ( 3 ) 1,970 (522)
Notes: Cross-tabulation of the total number of contracts and associated patents (in parenthesis) for each R&D category and
stage in our dataset.
Contract amounts are relatively large and highly skewed: 50 percent of contracts have an
award price below $998,000, while 10 percent of contract spending is on contracts worth more
than $7.4 million. The average award amount is approximately $4 million, but the average total
cost, including all subsequent modifications, averages $4.9 million. Correspondingly, the average
expected and final contract durations, including any delays, are 1,000 and 1,113 days, respectively.
The significant cost increase is typical of R&D activity, which is compounded by the cost-plus
nature of most contracts in our sample (95 percent). The prevalence of cost-plus contracts in DoD
procurement is well documented (Carril and Duggan 2020). It is explained by the DoD’s interest
in achieving timely completion of contracts whose cost is highly uncertain at the time of bidding.24
However, we find that most tendering processes are characterized by full and open competition
(81 percent), consistent with the statistics on the entire population (Decarolis et al. 2021). The
main characteristics of these contracts—depending on whether they are associated with at least
one patent—are presented in Table (2). R&D contracts that lead to one or more patents are on
average larger, last longer, and receive more bids. This is consistent with de Rassenfosse et al.
(2019), who show that the size and duration of a contract are positively associated with the total
number of patents associated with the contract.
Table (3) shows the characteristics of the contracting units. Each office spends an average of
$0.54 billion per fiscal year on 65 different R&D projects. Contracting Employees are 292, 32 of
which are certainly COs according to available FedBizOpps records. Retirement Eligible represents
consist of an R&D process, only the commercialization of the output. However, their share of the raw transaction
data is only approximately 3 percent.
24See Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for a detailed study of the trade-off between time and cost to completion induced
by contract pricing format.
17
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Project Level
No Patents With Patents
Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev.
Award Amount ($ ,000) 3432.95 959.83 14728.58 10703.81 3071.42 23041.69
Total Cost ($ ,000) 4092.92 1042.87 17227.72 13314.69 4009.57 26729.48
Expected Duration (days) 967.09 823.00 632.40 1333.86 1194.00 785.99
Total Duration (days) 1075.48 1003.50 633.12 1495.86 1462.00 786.95
# Patents 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.97 1.00 4.97
Cost Plus 0.94 1.00 0.23 0.96 1.00 0.20
Fully Competed 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.79 1.00 0.41
Last Week FY 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.28
Same State (Buyer/Performance) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.16 0.00 0.37
Also a Specialist 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.81 1.00 0.39
# Bids 6.70 2.00 15.89 9.47 2.00 25.24
N 1794 176
Notes: The level of observation is the contract. The share of contract associated with at least one patent is 9.81 percent.
an average of 22 percent of the contracting workforce. Actual retirement counts are low during the
period (3 percent of the contracting workforce and 15 percent of the Retirement Eligible). This
results in high non-retiree counts, 54 per office on average.25
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Office
Mean Median S.D.
R&D Budget ($ ,000) 536270.00 394194.22 468614.23
# R&D Contracts 65.67 74.00 47.19
# COs 32.11 26.86 25.55
# GS-1102 292.10 111.00 321.25
Experienced GS-1102 2.33 2.08 1.50
Non-retirement 53.83 21.50 51.40
Retirement Eligible 65.17 26.00 62.55
Retirement Actual 10.50 5.00 12.67
N 30
Notes: The level of observation is the contract office and fiscal year.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline analysis
We begin the presentation of our results with Table (4), which displays the estimates corre-
sponding to the binary version of Equation (2), that is
Pr (Patenti,k,t,o = 1|Log#COk,t,Xi, Zk,t, ζt , ζo) =
Φ (c+ βLog#COk,t + γXi + δZk,t + ζt + ζo) ,
(3)
25Since workforce is planned in the previous fiscal year, the fair comparison between Retirement Eligible at t-1
is with Retirement Actual at t. Non-retirement follows this scheme and that is the reason why the average of
Non-retirement in Table (3) differs from the mean difference between Retirement Eligible and Retirement Actual.
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where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Thus, we estimate the binomial
response to our variable of interest β via a probit model.26 In this specification, as compared to
Equation (2), we exclude office fixed effects to avoid perfect collinearity because we observe that
in our panel COs are grouped in contracting offices and never switch.
Moving from left to right expands the set of controls included. Column 1 reports the most
parsimonious model specification and only includes budget and purchases as covariates controlling
for office size. Holding the office’s budget and purchases in a given fiscal year helps us interpret
each additional CO colleague as an actual reduction in the office’s total procurement workload.
Column 2 contains CO and fixed effects for the fiscal year. The former is key to our identification,
as discussed in Section 2.2, while the latter accounts for the government budget cycle affecting all
offices simultaneously, with the resulting time-varying sources of bias. Column 3 includes controls
for project value and duration to capture unobserved features of the underlying R&D activity
associated with the project scale, which may predict project success and potentially correlate
with the office-level workload. The construction of these variables proceeds as follows. Using the
universe of R&D contracts sourced from FPDS, we evaluate within each of the R&D category cells
the empirical distribution of final costs and final duration of contracts. We then assign the final
cost and duration of the contract in our sample to the respective decile of the category-specific
distribution. We include this classification with fixed effects for both dimensions. To control
for another shared layer of unobserved characteristics, column 4 also includes fixed effects for
the procurement category and procurement phase of R&D. Controlling for procurement typology
is useful for controlling for time-invariant unobserved characteristics related to the probability of
generating a patent. In addition, controlling for the stage of R&D activity is particularly important
because contracts awarded to conduct basic research may be characterized by a higher degree of
uncertainty and have a lower probability of being associated with a patent than contracts for applied
research. Finally, column 5 contains the dummies Last Week, Same State, and Specialist, which
capture possible dimensions that may be simultaneously correlated with outcome and treatment.
This is our favored specification.27 To facilitate interpretation of the estimates, we report as
coefficients the average marginal effects with robust standard errors. In Appendix B, we discuss
how our results are virtually unchanged when standard errors are assumed to be homoscedastic or
clustered at different levels.
In line with the descriptive evidence, a naive association between workload and patents (column
1) leads to a positive and statistically significant estimate; however, the coefficient loses significance
once additional controls are included. In particular, this already happens in column 2, where we
add officer and fiscal year fixed effects. Finally, adding more controls increases the magnitude
of the estimates but not their precision. Despite the inclusion of these controls, the problem of
26An alternative approach is to estimate only a linear probability model. This robustness check of the methodology
is discussed in detail in the appendix. The well-known weakness of the LPM is that the fitted values need not lie
in the unit interval, so predicted probabilities below zero or above one are common. We do not consider the linear
probability model appropriate in our context as the underlying distribution of patents per contract is quite sparse,
with many zeros for the contracts without patents, leading to a mean of 0.14 for the binary patent metric, quite far
from the interval 0.4-0.6 that would accommodate well both methodologies.
27Please note that the working sample amounts to 1,173 observations instead of the 1,970 presented in Table (2).
This sample reduction is mostly due to the CO fixed effects predicting success or failure perfectly. For the sake of
comparability, all model specifications are executed on the working sample. Table (B2) in Appendix B displays the
robustness of our IV probit’s results to the use of a 2SLS using the full sample of contracts.
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Table 4: Structural Model - Probit
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-# COs 0.16∗∗∗ 0.049 0.085 0.088 0.084
(0.048) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
CO FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs No No Yes Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs No No No Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
N 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173
Notes: Coefficients report average marginal effects. In addition to the reported fixed effects, controls for budget
and purchases in the unit-year are included in all specifications. Controls include indicators for last week of fiscal
year, seller and buyer located in the same state, assistance from a contract specialist. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p < .01.
potential downward bias in the estimates of the structural probit workload remains, as discussed
in Section 2.2. To address these concerns, we implement an IV strategy based on non-retirement
as the instrument.
For this approach to be valid, we need to satisfy two conditions. First, the instrument must
cause the variation in the treatment variable; in other words, the variation in non-retirement rates
over time must have some causal power in explaining the variation in CO employment. Second, the
instrument must not affect the outcome variable directly but only indirectly through the treatment
variable. For this exclusion restriction to be satisfied, we need to show that the instrument affects
the outcome variable only through the treatment (i.e., the non-retirement must relate to the patents
because it correlates with CO employment), conditional on other possible confounding effects (i.e.,
the instrument must be independent of potential outcomes).
As for the strength of the instrument, Table (5) shows the first-stage results. Non-retirement
is expressed in log-terms and enters with a positive and significant term. Sudden non-separations
trigger a positive employment effect, as expected. In numbers, a one percentage point increase
in non-retirement induces a 0.3 percentage point increase in CO employment. The elasticity of
the effect is less than one because we regress CO employment on the non-retirement counts for
all contracting employees—not only the non-retirement for COs.28 Standard statistical tests of
the performance of our instrument—reported at the bottom of Table (5)— reject weak and under
identification, and advocate a strong first-stage relation. Figure (3) provides visual evidence of
how Non-retirement affects # COs. The variables are residualized by including the variables
from column 5 of Table (4) as controls and grouping them in binner scatterplots as in Cattaneo
et al. (2019). More specifically, each dot represents the residualized IV’s mean statistic and the
residualized endogenous variable within each bin. This graphical evidence further stresses the
existence of a positive effect of our IV on project innovativeness.
In terms of the exclusion restriction of our instrument, we believe that the sudden non-
28We emphasize again that the instrument is constructed using FedScope data and the GS-1102 classification,
which do not distinguish between COs and other procurement bureaucrats. Instead, the endogenous metric for
employment is constructed using FedBizOpp records that assign a responsible CO to each contract. However, we
control for project-level assistance from a contract specialist in our base specification.
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Figure 3: Visual Representation of the First Stage
Notes: Graphical representation of the relationships between # COs and Non-retirement. The variables are residualized,
including as controls those from column 5 of Table (5). Each graph is a binned scatterplot. This means that each point
represents the mean statistic of the residualized IV and the residualized endogenous variable inside each bin. The selected
number of bins is 122, and it is optimal in minimizing the (asymptotic) integrated mean-squared error following Cattaneo
et al. (2019).
Table 5: First Stage Regressions
Log-# COs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-(Non-retirement) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.00748) (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0630) (0.0626)
Weak Id. 407 20 20 18 18
Under Id. 265 32 33 32 32
CO FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs No No Yes Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs No No No Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
N 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173
Notes: We report the Wald F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) and LM test statistic for under
identification (Kleibergen-Paap). In addition to the reported fixed effects, controls for budget and purchases in the
unit-year are included in all specifications. Controls include indicators for last week of fiscal year awards, seller and
buyer located in the same state, assistance from a contract specialist. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
separation refers to an existing experienced employee who has already reached full productivity
and not to a newly hired officer who has not yet reached full productivity. As a result, we expect
this exogenous labor surplus as good for the R&D office outcomes, but only through a variation
in workload. This is confirmed by the reduced-form relationship between patent and the instru-
ment, as the coefficients on the instrument tend to enter with a positive and significant effect on
our outcome variable (see Table 6). More specifically about the exclusion restriction, we need
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Table 6: Reduced-form Regressions
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-(Non-retirement) 0.024∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.011) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
CO FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs No No Yes Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs No No No Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
N 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173
Notes: The coefficients report average marginal effects. In addition to the reported fixed effects, controls for budget
and purchases in the unit-year are included in all specifications. Controls include indicators for last week of fiscal
year, seller and buyer located in the same state, assistance from a contract specialist. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05.
to consider that non-separation could determine a surplus of skills in the form of knowledge and
timely managerial decisions, which can also positively impact the quality of work. Once eligible
for retirement, the CO could postpone the decision to retire for some time. As long as the primary
determinant of retirement now versus later is idiosyncratic and depends on personal circumstances,
in addition to unobserved office- and year-level circumstances shared by the other employees, we
can include the fixed effects, and the instrument will be valid.
Thus, the validity of the instrument depends on the unobserved office features being as good as
random. Of course, time-varying office-level characteristics may also influence retirement decisions.
If the decision to postpone retirement changes due to office tasks and characteristics changes, the
exogeneity assumption would not be satisfied, and the instrument would not be valid. We use
variation in the set of employees eligible for retirement and need to test its orthogonality to their
workplace features. A crippling condition for us would be that the workplace characteristics affect
the individual decision to postpone retirement. This would create a potential reverse causality
problem, in particular when large changes in workload somehow induce people to stay at work
even though eligible for retirement. To test this, we collapse the data at the office-year level
and run an auxiliary regression analysis—presented in Table (7)—to detect possible observable
determinants of our instruments and provide evidence for our exogeneity argument. Based on the
way we construct the instrument, we find that sudden postponement of retirement is mechanically
associated with contracting employment metrics (i.e., # GS-1102 and # Exp. GS-1102). There
is no clear pattern of association between non-retirement counts and any of the other potential
office-level predictors that we include through our data and that appear in Table (7): none reach
statistical significance across model specifications. Some unobserved change in a qualitative factor
of contracts may still drive retirement, undermining identification—in addition to scale variables—,
but we cannot detect much from observable factors. A further, detailed discussion on the exclusion
restriction of our IV is presented in Appendix A.
We can now turn to the presentation of the second-stage relationship between patent and
workload. The structural relationship from the probit model depicted by Table (4) shows that the
estimated effects of decreasing workload in the patentability of R&D contracts are not significant.
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Table 7: Non-retirement Predictors
Log-(Non-retirement)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(mean) University -0.69 -0.72 -1.01 -0.93
(0.64) (1.15) (0.58) (0.56)
(mean) # Bids 0.00074 -0.013 -0.00062 -0.0045
(0.0031) (0.018) (0.0040) (0.0035)
(mean) Same State -0.50 -4.33∗ -0.41 0.15
(0.60) (2.12) (0.55) (0.37)
(mean) Last Week 0.47 -0.21 0.17 -0.45
(0.51) (3.03) (0.52) (0.84)
(mean) Log-Budget -0.031 -0.15∗∗ 0.23 0.15
(0.23) (0.058) (0.28) (0.17)
(mean) Log-Purchases -0.019 0.21∗∗ -0.18 -0.075
(0.074) (0.075) (0.13) (0.12)
(mean) # GS-1102 0.57∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.50∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.041) (0.26) (0.081)
(mean) # Exp. GS-1102 -0.019 -0.021 -0.071∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.016) (0.036) (0.035) (0.051)
Constant 5.36∗∗∗ 6.84 1.91 1.09 -2.98 -3.66
(0.89) (7.30) (4.46) (0.84) (5.78) (2.82)
Office FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No
Fiscal Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.98 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
N 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
Notes: The table presents two sets of possible predictors of the office-year non-retirement instrument. Columns (1) and
(2) include contract and contractor characteristics demeaned at the office-year level. Columns (3) and (4) include office
features. Columns (5) and (6) nest the set of covariates. OLS estimates include, alternatively, office and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
This result would suggest that additional CO colleagues in the office do not affect the innovativeness
of their purchases. Offices with more COs are not more or less likely to generate patents given the
same budget and purchases. However, the IV probit results shown in Table (8) suggest that the
structural probit results are misleading when exogenous changes in the number of COs are taken
into account. The set of controls is identical in all columns and is the same as those of Table (4).
According to the baseline IV probit estimates from column 5, in our sample an additional CO in
the office—corresponding to a 3 percent increase in average CO employment—leads to an increase
in the probability of generating patents by about two percentage points.29 Compared to the probit
29From Table (2), the baseline probability of patenting is 0.0981. The interpretation of the baseline result of
our probit model is as follows: A one-unit increase in the log number of COs is associated with a 111 percentage
point increase in the probability of patent equal to 1 (or equivalently, an increase in the expected probability of
0.0981 + 1.11 = 1.2081). Such an implausible number results from the huge increase in the underlying predictor.
From the perspective of the CO employment variable itself, # COs, being natural-log-transformed, is multiplied
by approximately 2.718, representing an approximately 172 percent increase in average CO employment. To make
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estimates from column 5 of Table (4), the magnitude of the IV probit estimates is more than one
order of magnitude larger than and exceeds the 95 percent confidence interval of the structural
relationship. To provide a more transparent economic interpretation of the estimates, we can
consider what would happen if we used them to infer the effect of raising the workload of all offices
to the level of the office with the largest backlog in our sample. To do so, we first collapse our
information at the office-year level. Then, we regress employment in contracting offices on budget
and purchases. Finally, we rank the office year in terms of residualized employment (interpretable
as backlog). In our data, the office-year pair with the highest workload is the purchasing unit
Rome Laboratory in 2012. If we bring all office-year pairs up to its level, this implies a reduction
in the number of patents by 13 percentage points on average per contract (i.e., about 50 percent
less likely), or about 33 total across all contracts in the dataset on a yearly basis).
Table 8: Second Stage - IV Probit
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-# COs 0.14∗∗ 0.96∗ 0.94∗∗ 1.09∗∗ 1.11∗∗
(0.072) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49)
CO FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs No No Yes Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs No No No Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
N 1173 1173 1173 1173 1173
Notes: Coefficients report average marginal effects. In addition to the reported fixed effects, controls for budget
and purchases in the unit-year are included in all specifications. Controls include indicators for last week of fiscal
year, seller and buyer located in the same state, assistance from a contract specialist. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05.
4.2 Robustness analysis
We conclude this section with a brief summary of the findings from the main robustness checks.
To simplify the presentation, we present the findings by categorizing them into three groups.
First, to address potential concerns about the definition of the workload index, we execute the
regression shown in equation (3) with alternative endogenous employment measures sourced from
the FedScope’s workforce data. Second, to assess the soundness of the identification strategy, we
explore alternative definitions of the instrument by again using the FedScope dataset. Finally,
we use additional variables from the FPDS to test for possible omitted variables that could bias
our results. In essence, these additional results further exploit the richness of the dataset. While
the overall qualitative results prove robust, these additional findings play an important role in
strengthening the quality and depth of the analysis. We refer the reader to Appendix B for
the interpretation more tractable and realistic, we may want to see the impact on project innovation of adding one
additional CO. To do this, we need only divide the marginal effect of 111 percentage points by one log-units of CO
employment. Since the average number of CO -employed in our sample before the log transformation is 32.11, the
marginal increase by one log unit of employment amounts to 32.11 * (2.718 - 1), which is an absolute increase of
about 55 employees. Proportionally, one additional CO in the office—implying an average increase of 1/32.11 = 3.11
percent of # COs—corresponds to an increase in the probability of patenting of 1.11/55.16 = 2 percentage points.
24
additional robustness checks.
The combination of the FPDS and FedBizOpps allows us to identify the COs in charge of the
procurement process and count the distinct officers active in a given contracting unit-year. We
want to test the robustness of our results against alternative and less conservative specifications
of CO employment. By relying on available information from FedScope, we are able to provide an
alternative and less conservative count of CO employment. As stressed in Section 3.1, the GS-1102
count (i.e., contracting employment) includes all COs and other contracting employees involved in
the procurement process at different levels of the hierarchy and with different tasks. In Table (9),
we show how the estimates change relative to our baseline from Table (8)—reported in column
1—when we change only the endogenous variable. The coefficients from column 2 suggest that
replacing our baseline index of CO employment with the total count of GS-1102 has no statistical
difference in terms of its effect on the outcome. To capture the effect heterogeneity that arises
from GS-1102 having managerial responsibilities, we condition GS-1102 in column 3 on having at
least pay grade 14.30 Although qualitatively the same, the magnitude of the effect is one-third of
the baseline but more precisely estimated.
Our instrument exploits the unexpected gaps between actual and expected retirement. In the
baseline analysis, we construct this variable as the log difference between the two. As we rely on
the same underlying variables, we want to test the qualitative stability of our results when we use
alternative specifications of IV with a similar interpretation. In Table (10), we benchmark the
results in column 1, where we report the baseline. In column 2, we report the ratio of Retirement
Eligible to Retirement Actual. In column 3, we use the logarithm of this ratio. The second
stage results are stable and statistically indistinguishable across all alternative linear or log-linear
specifications of the non-retirement counts. Finally, column 4 uses log counts of total retirements as
in Warren (2014) as an alternative instrument for the workload. Again, the results are qualitatively
and quantitatively stable.
The results of Warren (2014) suggest that the decision to leave contracts less complete may
also affect other procurement terms, in particular the extent to which a project is competed at the
bidding phase and the pricing structure of the contract offered. Less complete contracts benefit
less from the competition, so busier COs use less competitive mechanisms. Cost-plus contracts
facilitate the management of contract renegotiations and are therefore preferred by COs in the
current and foreseeable backlog. The author shows that an increased workload for COs due to
backlog spikes leads to fewer complete contracts and, consequently, higher use of noncompetitive
and cost-plus agreements. Following these arguments, we believe that other dimensions of the
design process observed via FPDS may be affected by workload. Although in the R&D realm
contracts are highly incomplete by design, some variation at the intensive margin could still be
captured by contract pricing (i.e., cost-plus vs. fixed price) and the choice of the officer to make
the notice full and open to competition or to exclude some sources. Another decision that the CO
makes in the solicitation is the bidding process. In standard procurement processes, the bidding
process usually boils down to a choice between a sealed low-bid auction and a negotiated proposal
format. According to FAR, bidding procedures in R&D procurements can vary, and the path
30GS-14 is the 14th pay grade on the General Schedule, the salary scale used to set salaries for most government
employees. Pay grade 14 is reserved for top positions such as supervisors, high-level technical specialists, and top
advanced degree holders.
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chosen depends heavily on the nature of the research features being procured. Whether pricing,
competition, and tendering procedures also affect our outcome variable is again an open question
for which there is neither empirical evidence nor theoretical modeling. However, we believe it is
relevant to test the robustness of our results against the inclusion of these problematic controls
that capture contract completeness decided by CO and could bias our baseline results. In column
2 of Table (11), we add two binary variables to the baseline model specification—in column 1—
indicating the cost-plus nature of the contract (as opposed to a fixed price) and open (vs. restricted)
competition. The coefficient is insignificant, while the coefficient on our main variable is only
marginally affected. As we do not know the difference between solicitation procedures in the R&D
context, we take a data-driven approach in column 3 and include a set of fixed effects for the
different categories of procedures in the baseline model specification. Specifically, 81 percent is
basic research (FAR 6.102), 11 percent is negotiated proposal/quotes, whereas the remainder is
split between sealed bids, single sourcing (FAR 13.106), and multiple award fair opportunities (FAR
16.505). Again, the main coefficient of interest is positive and significant, with an indistinguishable
magnitude compared to the baseline analysis for the same sample. Finally, column 4 includes both
dummy variables and fixed effects with similar results. The results prove to be very robust to the
inclusion of decision variables that are up to the discretion of the CO, in particular in the R&D
contracting realm.
Table 9: Alternative Specifications of Endogenous Employment






Log-# Exp. GS-1102 0.31***
(0.10)
N 1173 1173 1173
Notes: Baseline results—column 5 of Table (8), reported in column 1—are replicated with alternative measures of contracting
employment. # COs is replaced as endogenous variable by # GS-1102 and # Experienced GS-1102 in columns 2 and 3,
respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. **p < .05, ***p < .01
5 Workload and Contract Specifications
The results of the analyses presented in the previous sections clearly show that the workload of the
officer in charge of the award of an R&D procurement process harms the contract performance as
measured by patents. However, the data at hand do not allow us to unambiguously identify the
channel through which the additional workload worsens contracting output. As discussed above,
Warren (2014) analyzes the impact of workload in the context of regular procurement and finds that
workload negatively affects contract completeness and, as a consequence, the contract performance.
Warren (2014) measures contract completeness mainly by looking at the type of contract pricing
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Table 10: Alternative Instruments
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log-# COs 1.11** 1.74** 1.76*** 0.75**
(0.49) (0.70) (0.60) (0.30)
N 1173 884 884 1173
Notes: Baseline results—column 5 of Table (8), reported in column 1—are replicated with alternative IVs: Retirement Eligible
t− 1 / Retirement Actual t in Column 2; log(Retirement Eligible t− 1 / Retirement Actual t) in Column 3; Log(Retirement
Actual t) in Column 4. Coefficients report average marginal effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. **p < .05,
***p < .01
Table 11: Inclusion of Endogenous Omitted Controls
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log-# COs 1.11** 0.96** 0.98** 0.88**
(0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.41)
Cost Plus Pricing -0.025 -0.024
(0.047) (0.047)
Open Competition 0.043 0.050
(0.042) (0.042)
Solicitation Proc. FEs No No Yes Yes
N 1173 1126 1172 1125
Notes: Baseline results—column 5 of Table (8), reported in column 1—are replicated with the inclusion of additional covari-
ates: Cost Plus and Open Competition dummies in column 2; Solicitation Procedures fixed effects in column 3; Cost Plus
and Open Competition dummies plus Solicitation Procedures fixed effects in column 4. Coefficients report average marginal
effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. **p < .05.
selected by the contracting officers, i.e., a cost-reimbursement vs. fixed-price contract. Although
we can assume contract specification to be a relevant channel in the context of R&D contracting,
we cannot test this hypothesis using variables such as contract pricing. As described in Section 1,
R&D contracts are by definition focused on goals for which work or methods cannot be precisely
described in advance, and FAR openly recommends using cost-reimbursement contracts, i.e., cost-
plus contract instead of fixed-price contracts. Our data confirms COs generally comply with this
recommendation as 95 percent of the contracts in our sample are awarded using a cost-plus pricing
scheme.
Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that the impact of workload on contract performance
passes through tender and contract specifications. A CO’s main problem in the award of an R&D
contract is describing the work requirement in a way that is clear to the prospective contractors,
even in situations in which the CO does not have a complete understanding of the work in advance.
The CO is responsible for translating a rather abstract idea into a language that is contractually
clear to the prospective contractors (US Air Force 1967). To succeed in such a complex task, the CO
generally closely interacts with the internal scientific staff responsible for the issuance of the tender
and other technical associates and must develop an ad-hoc approach for each new procurement
activity. Clearly, a higher workload for the CO may harm her capacity to maintain adequate levels
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of interaction with the technical staff and especially her ability to translate tender-specific but
uncertain technical objectives into contractually binding behavior for prospective contractors.
Although we can neither observe nor proxy the actual effort the CO put in for specific procure-
ment activities and, therefore, we cannot determine if the increases in workload lead to a reduction
in the effort provided for a single contract, the heterogeneity of the R&D activities in our sample
allows us to provide indirect evidence of the importance of the COs in drafting solicitations and
contractual agreements nonetheless. The contracts in our sample are awarded for the performance
of work at different stages of the R&D process. Table (2) reports that 25 percent of the contract was
awarded for the performance of basic research, 52 percent for the performance of applied research,
and the remaining 23 percent for development research.31 The importance of the CO in the tender
specification is likely to change with the stage of the R&D work procured. In the procurement of
basic research whose direct applicability is still uncertain, agencies often rely on a Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA).32 BAAs are broad in their subject matter and may be used by agencies
to fulfill their requirements for scientific study and experimentation directed toward advancing
the state-of-the-art or increasing knowledge or understanding rather than focusing on a specific
system or hardware solution. Generally, a BAA describes the agency’s research interest, either for
an individual program requirement or for broadly defined areas of interest, but does not include
a clear and complete work statement concerning the area of exploration and the end objectives
of a contract. In this context, the importance of the CO in drafting a request for proposal and a
subsequent contract that would provide the right incentive to the prospective contractor appears
to be rather limited. However, contracts for the procurement of R&D work that happens at more
advanced stages of development are relatively definable. In such cases, it is rather straightforward
for the CO to draft a request for proposal and the resulting contract in a clear and complete
fashion.
The relevance of the CO’s ability in translating an abstract idea in a contractually clear work
statement reaches its maximum for contracts awarded for intermediate stages of development,
especially for the applied research and exploratory development phase. Hence, if the negative
effect of increases in workload on contract performance is connected to a reduction in the effort
of the CO in the key moments of solicitation and contract drafting, we should expect our results
to be stronger for contracts awarded for applied research than for the other stages. To test this
hypothesis, we split our sample into three groups based on the R&D stages, Basic Research,
Applied Research, and Advanced Development, and ran the same model as in the focal analysis.
Table (12) reports the results of the split-sample analysis. As the table shows, the overall negative
baseline effect seems to be largely driven by contracts awarded for applied research. Although we
are aware this result does not provide conclusive evidence, it strongly hints at the proposed idea
that backlogged COs are indeed unable to devote enough time to tender and contract specification,
resulting in a reduction in the performance of the contracts they award.
31Due to the high comparability in their nature, we group the subsequent development stages (i.e., stages 4 to 6)
together with stage 3 within the broad development stage umbrella.
32See FAR 35.016.
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Table 12: Sensitivity Analysis with R&D Stages
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
Log-# COs -1.03 2.43*** 1.60
(4.30) (0.84) (2.18)
CO FEs Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs Yes Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs Yes Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 482 1014 452
Notes: Baseline analysis is replicated in the subsample of basic research (i.e., stage 1), applied research (i.e., stage 2),
development (i.e., stage 3-6) contracts in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. R&D stages are omitted in specifications 1
and 2 due to collinearity. The coefficients are estimated via 2SLS due to insufficient power. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. ***p < .01.
6 Conclusions
As modern economies have evolved from industrial- to knowledge-based, the activity of public
administrations has also changed over time, and the governance of technology has become a crucial
part of their activity. In public procurement, these structural changes are compelling governments
to procure increasingly complex and costly products and services. In the US, this increasing
complexity is going hand in hand with an increasing number and value of procurements. In
response, the government has focused on streamlining acquisition rules and giving more discretion
to front-line officials (Carril 2021; Calvo et al. 2019; Giuffrida and Rovigatti 2018). However,
human resources are lagging behind due to the inability to retain and recruit talent at all levels
of the administration. The result is a backlogged contracting workforce, which generates a major
capacity constraint for effective public spending in general, and investment in R&D in particular.
To provide the first quantification of the latter bottleneck, this paper sheds light on the mi-
croeconomic implications for innovative activities due to the workload of public buyers of R&D.
Our research is in the spirit of Furman and Stern 2011’s as we are interested in understanding how
institutions shape new knowledge and what frictions they encounter, and complements Warren
2014’s findings on how a backlogged contracting personnel affects standard procurements’ perfor-
mance outcomes. We combine several different data sources to link tender, contract, patent, and
office records to the identity of the CO. We focus on contracts awarded by the contracting offices
that compose the AFRL to effectively count the number of officials actively involved in procuring
R&D projects in a given fiscal year: we use this measure as an inverse indicator of the office’s
workload, after controlling for the budget and purchases. To overcome endogeneity in the R&D
contract outcomes and buyer’s workload relationship, we implement an IV strategy combined with
CO fixed effects to identify the effect of the latter on the former. The identification comes from
unanticipated retirement shifts among COs, which we use as an instrument for the workload. Our
results are robust to several modifications and stress that a large increase in patenting at the
extensive margin occurs when the same officer is exposed to a declining workload.
29
References
AAP (2007): “Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy and the United States Congress,” Executive Office of the President.
Acemoglu, D. (2005): “Politics and economics in weak and strong states,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 52, 1199–1226.
Asch, B., S. J. Haider, and J. Zissimopoulos (2005): “Financial Incentives and Retirement:
Evidence from Federal Civil Service Workers,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 427–440.
Bajari, P. and S. Tadelis (2001): “Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procure-
ment Contracts,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 387–407.
Baltrunaite, A., C. Giorgiantonio, S. Mocetti, and T. Orlando (2021): “Discretion and
Supplier Selection in Public Procurement,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
37, 134–166.
Bandiera, O., A. Prat, and T. Valletti (2009): “Active and Passive Waste in Government
Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment,”The American Economic Review, 99, 1278–1308.
Best, M. C., J. Hjort, and D. Szakonyi (2017): “Individuals and Organizations as Sources
of State Effectiveness,” NBER Working Paper 23350, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, MA.
Bhattacharya, V. (2018): “An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of
the DOD SBIR Program,” Working Paper, Northwestern University, Evanston.
Bruce, J. R. and J. M. de Figueiredo (2020): “Innovation in the U.S. Government,” Working
Paper 27181, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bruce, J. R., J. M. de Figueiredo, and B. S. Silverman (2019): “Public Contracting
for Private Innovation: Government Capabilities, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes,”
Strategic Management Journal, 40, 533–555.
Bucciol, A., R. Camboni, and P. Valbonesi (2020): “Purchasing Medical Devices: The Role
of Buyer Competence and Discretion,” Journal of Health Economics, 74.
Calvo, E., R. Cui, and J. C. Serpa (2019): “Oversight and efficiency in public projects: A
regression discontinuity analysis,” Management Science, 65, 5651–5675.
Carril, R. (2021): “Rules versus Discretion in Public Procurement,” Economics Working Papers
1765, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Carril, R. and M. Duggan (2020): “The Impact of Industry Consolidation on Government
Procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense Contracting,” Journal of Public Economics,
184, 104141.
Cattaneo, M. D., R. K. Crump, M. H. Farrell, and Y. Feng (2019): “On binscatter,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.09608.
30
de Rassenfosse, G., A. Jaffe, and E. Raiteri (2019): “The procurement of innovation by
the US government,” PloS one, 14, e0218927.
de Rassenfosse, G., G. Pellegrino, and E. Raiteri (2020): “Do Patents Enable Disclosure?
Evidence from the Invention Secrecy Act,” Working Papers 9, Chair of Innovation and IP Policy.
Decarolis, F. (2014): “Awarding Price, Contract Performance and Bids Screening: Evidence
from Procurement Auctions,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6, 108–132.
——— (2018): “Comparing Public Procurement Auctions,” International Economic Review, 59,
391–419.
Decarolis, F., G. de Rassenfosse, L. Giuffrida, E. Iossa, V. Mollisi, E. Raiteri, and
G. Spagnolo (2021): “Buyers’ Role in Innovation Procurement: Evidence from U.S. Military
R&D Contracts,” The Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Forthcoming.
Decarolis, F., L. M. Giuffrida, E. Iossa, V. Mollisi, and G. Spagnolo (2020): “Bureau-
cratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organi-
zation, 36, 537–597.
Edquist, C. (2015): “Innovation-related Public Procurement as a Demand-oriented Innovation
Policy Instrument,” Papers in Innovation Studies 2015/28, Lund University, CIRCLE - Center
for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy, Lund.
Fleming, L., H. Greene, G. Li, M. Marx, and D. Yao (2019): “Government-funded research
increasingly fuels innovation,” Science, 364, 1139–1141.
Furman, J. L. and S. Stern (2011): “Climbing atop the Shoulders of Giants: The Impact of
Institutions on Cumulative Research,” American Economic Review, 101, 1933–63.
GAO (2017): “High-Risk series 2017,” Tech. rep., GAO-17-317, US Government Accountability
Office.
——— (2019): “DOD Increased Use of Human Capital Flexibilities but Could Improve Monitor-
ing,” Tech. rep., GAO-19-509, US Government Accountability Office.
Gerardino, M. P., S. Litschig, and D. Pomeranz (2017): “Can Audits Backfire? Evidence
from Public Procurement in Chile,” Working Paper 23978, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Giuffrida, L. M. and G. Rovigatti (2018): “Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest?
Evidence from Federal Procurement,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-045, ZEW - Centre for
European Economic Research, Mannheim.
Howell, S. T. (2017): “Financing Innovation: Evidence from R&D Grants,” American Economic
Review, 107, 1136–1164.
Kang, K. and R. A. Miller (2017): “Winning by Default: Why is There So Little Competition
in Government Procurement?” Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh.
31
Lewis, G. B. and D. Pitts (2018): “Deciding to Retire from the Federal Service,” Review of
Public Personnel Administration, 38, 49–82.
Liebman, J. B. and N. Mahoney (2017): “Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End
Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement,” American Economic Review, 107, 3510–49.
Mait, J. N. (2005): “Making IT Happen: Transforming Military Information Technology,” Tech.
rep., National Defense University Washington DC Center for Technology and National.
Moretti, E., C. Steinwender, and J. Van Reenen (2019): “The Intellectual Spoils of War?
Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers,” Working Paper 26483, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Peña, V., S. V. Howieson, B. Lal, J. R. Behrens, B. L. Zuckerman, M. V. Merrill, and
J. L. Zhu (2017): Early Stage Research and Technology at US Federal Government Agencies,
Institute for Defense Analyses.
Raiteri, E. (2018): “A Time to Nourish? Evaluating the Impact of Public Procurement on
Technological Generality through Patent Data,” Research Policy, 47, 936–952.
Rau, C. A. and P. J. Stambersky (2009): “Management and oversight of services acquisition
within the United States Army,” Tech. rep., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
Rendon, R. G., U. M. Apte, and A. Apte (2012): “Services acquisition in the DoD: A
comparison of management practices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force,” Tech. rep., Defence
Acquisition University.
Simcoe, T. and M. W. Toffel (2014): “Government green procurement spillovers: Evidence
from municipal building policies in California,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement, 68, 411–434.
US Air Force (1967): “Air Force Research and Development Contracting Officers’ Handbook,”
AFSC Pamphlet 70-2, Air Force System Command.
Warren, P. L. (2014): “Contracting Officer Workload, Incomplete Contracting, and Contractual
Terms,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 45, 395–421.
Weber, M. (1921): Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1921; German:
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie), vol. 1, University of Cali-
fornia Press (1978).
32
A Appendix: Discussion on the Exclusion Restriction
We further explore the soundness of the exclusion restriction by presenting a suggestive com-
plementary exercise and running IV regressions with an alternative definition of the endogenous
variable. For our instrument to be valid, the effect of unexpected variation in employment must
be mediated by a shift in workload; in our baseline setting, we (inversely) proxy workload with
CO employment and use office scale via purchases and budget as included instruments. If we fix
the latter two dimensions, we interpret an additional CO colleague as a reduction in the backlog
of work. However, this empirical design can be replicated by replacing each time CO employment
with one of two measures of office size as the endogenous workload index and controlling for the
remaining two variables as measures of scale. If the IV tests and results hold in the other two
cases, the exclusion restriction is not satisfied by construction, and other variables of scale size
can substitute for the workload. This auxiliary exercise is shown in Table (A1) for the working
sample. In columns 1 and 2, the endogenous workload variable is the number of awards and annual
procurement spending, respectively, while CO employment is as a covariate. In the first case, we
interpret an additional dollar spent, holding CO employment and purchases constant, as a proxy
for workload; in the second case, we interpret an additional contract, holding the associated budget
and CO employment constant, as a proxy for the workload. The instrumented coefficients are in
bold. In both cases, tests for instrument relevance indicate the non-validity of these alternative
IV analyses. The results confirm our idea that non-retirement affects the innovativeness of awards
via workload, but only via the employment dimension of the latter.
Table A1: Second Stage with Alternative Endogenous Workload Definition
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2)
Office R&D Budget -56.2∗∗∗ 0.62
(0.19) (0.55)
# Office R&D Awards -1.91∗∗∗ 3.99
(0.73) (2.65)
Log-# COs 16.0∗∗∗ -2.86
(1.06) (1.87)
Weak Id. 0 3
Under Id. 0 3
CO FEs Yes Yes
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes
Cost and Duration FEs Yes Yes
R&D Category FEs Yes Yes
R&D Stage FEs Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 1173 1173
Notes: We replicate column 5 of Table (8) by replacing the instrumented variable, which is in bold. We report the
Wald F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) and LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-
Paap). Control for budget and purchases in the unit-year always included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p < .01.
To corroborate further our IV strategy, we propose a state-of-the-art exercise hinging on the
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recent contribution from Kiviet (2020) to seek to actually test the exclusion restriction. Kiviet
(2020) presents an approach by which, without exploiting any external instruments, general linear
coefficient restrictions can be tested in a multiple regression model with an arbitrary number of
endogenous regressors. The strategy requires a flexible assumption on the degree of endogeneity of
all regressors. This approach allows generating statistical evidence on the tenability of exclusion
restrictions. When this yields an acceptable just-identifying or over-identifying set of instruments,
it provides the essential underlying building block for a standard or a series of incremental Sar-
gan–Hansen tests. We follow the Kiviet (2020) approach in our just-identified IV analysis to
produce further insights into the tenability of our exclusion restriction hypothesis. The left graph
of Figure (A1) shows different values of downward bias in Equation (3) (i.e., negative values of
postulated endogeneity), the p-values of the single just-identifying exclusion restriction tests for
CO employment. The instrument’s validity seems quite likely when it is close to -0.04, and it holds
over most of the negative space. In the right graph, Figure (A1) shows the 2SLS asymptotic 95
percent confidence interval (the yellow area) for β, which is invariant regarding the endogeneity
and centered at the 2SLS estimate 1.14 (solid blue line). It also shows the KLS estimator (the
solid red line), which varies with the postulated endogeneity, and the KLS asymptotic 95 percent
confidence interval (the grey area). The graph also shows that the 95 percent 2SLS confidence
interval, which is contingent on the validity of the instruments, conforms in width to a conservative
KLS-based interval contingent on the supposition and exogeneity of the instrument. This evidence
suggests that, with the likely size and direction of endogeneity, the 2SLS and KLS inference are
similar, and the exclusion restriction underlying our IV strategy’s validity is satisfied.
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B Appendix: Additional Robustness Analysis
This appendix reports additional robustness checks. For convenience, these results are subdi-
vided into two groups depending on whether the robustness analysis involves 1) the specification
of the standard errors; 2) the estimation method.
1. Robustness to the definition of the dependent variable. Baseline results—column 6 of Table
(9), reported in column 1—are replicated with different specifications of the standard errors:
homoscedastic standard errors in column 2; clusterization at the contracting office level in
column 3; clusterization at the R&D category level in column 4; clusterization at the level
of the state of performance in column 5.
2. Robustness to the estimation method. The baseline model—column 5 of Table (8), reported
in column 1—is replicated with different estimators using the sample from column 5 of Table
(8). Columns 2 and 3 report results of a 2SLS estimation using the working sample and the
full sample, respectively; column 4 retains perfect predictor variables in the maximization
process of the IV probit. This option is typically not used and may introduce numerical
instability. Normally, IV probit drops any endogenous or exogenous variables that perfectly
predict success or failure in the dependent variable. The associated observations are also
dropped. Results are robust to the employment of these alternative estimation methods.
Table B1: Robustness to the Standard Errors Definition
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log-# Officers FedBizOpp 1.11** 1.11** 1.11 1.11*** 1.14**
(0.49) (0.50) (0.73) (0.21) (0.58)
Observations 1173 1173 1173 1173 1170
Notes: Baseline results—column 5 of Table (8), reported in column 1—are replicated with different specifications of the
standard errors: homoscedastic standard errors in column 2; clusterization at the office level in column 3; clusterization at
the R&D category level in column 4; clusterization at the level of the state of performance in column 5. ** p < .05, ***
p < .01.
Table B2: Robustness to the Estimation Method
1(# Patents > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log-# Officers FedBizzOpp 1.11** 1.35** 0.93** 1.11**
(0.49) (0.62) (0.46) (0.49)
N 1173 1173 1948 1173
Notes: The baseline model—column 5 of Table (8), reported in column 1—is replicated with estimators other than the IV
probit. Columns 2 and 3 report results of a 2SLS estimation using the working sample and the full sample, respectively;
column 4 retains perfect predictor variables in the maximization process of the IV probit. ** p < .05.
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